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Reciprocity as a Basis for Challenging
Conglomerate Mergers Under the Clayton Act
INTRODUCTION

Conglomerate merger' activity has dominated the current postWorld War II merger movement.' In 1950, only thirty-eight per
cent of all mergers were conglomerate in nature.3 More recently,
however, conglomerate mergers have accounted for eighty to ninety
per cent of all mergers. Although merger activity declined after
reaching a peak level in 1969, 5 a significant new merger movement,
1. The term "conglomerate merger" originally referred to a merger between two companies in completely unrelated fields of business. Conglomerate mergers are now generally defined as all acquisitions which are not principally horizontal or vertical in nature. See Bauer,
Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Today's Law and
Tomorrow's Legislation, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 199, 200 n.7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bauer]. A
horizontal merger is one between firms producing identical products or close substitutes for
the same geographic market. See Turner, ConglomerateMergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAnv. L. REv. 1313, 1315 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner]. A vertical merger
is one between a supplier and a purchaser of a product. Id.
Conglomerate mergers are subdivided into three categories: (1) product extension mergers
between companies whose products are related but are not in direct competition; (2) geographic extension mergers between companies who produce the same product but for different geographic markets; and (3) "pure" conglomerate mergers between companies whose
products are completely unrelated. See Bryan, Conglomerate Mergers: Proposed Guidelines, 11 HARv. J. LEGIS. 31, 32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bryan].
2. In contrast, mergers involved in the first two great merger movements in United
States history, occurring from 1898 to 1903 and from 1925 to 1930, were principally horizontal and vertical in nature. See Note, Clayton § 7 and the Pure Conglomerate: The Business
of Buying Businesses, 35 U. PrrT. L. Rav. 115 (1973).
3. See Hearings on Conglomerate Mergers and Acquisitions Before Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopolies of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, (Statement of John H. Shenefield), reprintedin 345 TRADE REG. REP. 31 (August 8, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings].
4. A distinctive feature of the current merger movement involves the type of companies
participating in it. Although conglomerate merger activity in the 1960's was carried on
predominantly by a limited number of aggressive, high-growth firms such as Gulf & Western
Industries, Inc., International Telephone & Telegraph, Inc., and Levy-Temco-Vought, Inc.,
and was regarded as "faintly disreputable," the economic establishment has joined in the
recent merger surge as evidenced by the Mobil Ol-Marcor, Inc., Kennecott Copper-Carborundum Corporation, and Philip Morris-Miller Brewing mergers. See Pertschuk and Davidson, What's Wrong with Conglomerate Merges, 11 ANTrrRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 67 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Pertschuk and Davidson]. See also Winter, Conservative Firms Bent
on Profit Growth Join the Merger Cause, Wall St. J., Apr.11, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
5. A record number of 6,107 mergers and acquisitions were announced in 1969. See 973
ANTrrausT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-2 (July 17, 1980). After 1969, however, economic
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beginning in 1977 and continuing to the present, 6 has aroused considerable economic, political, and social concern.' Significantly, although this current movement is of a lesser magnitude than the
1960's movement, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of large mergers involving a purchase value of over $100
million."
Aggregate concentration 9 has increased concomitantly with conglomeration during the past twenty years. The top 200 manufacturing firms increased their share of national sales from forty-one
percent in 1955 to sixty-six per cent in 1977.10 Federal Trade Commission statistics indicate that mergers are responsible for approximately twenty-two per cent of the total growth of these firms.1 1
This recent surge of conglomerate acquisitions has attracted
widespread public attention to the problems of conglomeration and
aggregate concentration,"2 and has stimulated a re-examination of
the viability of federal antitrust merger law to deal with these
problems. The purpose of this article is to explore the potential

difficulties and attacks on conglomerate mergers by the Department of Justice combined to
reduce the number of conglomerate mergers. See Bryan, supra note 1, at 32.
6. The number of mergers increased from 1,299 in 1975 to 1,735 in 1977, over 2,000 in

1978, and approximately 2300 in 1979. See S.

KANWrr, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

§

17-03, at § 17-17 (1979).
7. Conglomerate mergers often result in few economic efficiencies, particularly in pure
conglomerate mergers where the product lines of the merging firms are unrelated. The opportunity for integration of production, research and development, or marketing and distribution functions is often extremely limited. Although improvement in management efficiency and ease of access to capital are potential benefits associated with conglomeration,
studies have indicated that these benefits are seldom realized. On the other hand, the significant political and social consequences attributed to increased conglomeration and aggregate
concentration include: the emergence of business corporations as a pre-eminent lobbying
force in the American political process; the upset of the balance of power between labor and
management; the disappearance of locally-owned enterprise; and limited opportunities for
self-fulfillment through economic roles. See generally Bauer, supra note 1, at 234-36; Blake,
Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. Rzv. 555, 557 (1973); Bryan,
supra note 1, at 36-46; Mueller, The Effects of Conglomerate Mergers: A Survey of the
Empirical Evidence, 1 J. OF BANKING & FINANCE 315, 317 (1977); Pertschuk and Davidson,
supra note 4, at 13-17.
8. The number of mergers involving a purchase value of over $100 million grew from 14
in 1975 to 41 in 1977, 80 in 1978, an 83 in 1979. See 973 ANTRusT & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) AA-2 (July 17, 1980).
9. "Aggregate concentration" refers to the concentration of economic assets in general,
without reference to concentration in any specific industry. See generally 1978 Hearings,
supra note 3, at 44-46.
10. See 973 ANTITusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-3 (July 17, 1980).
11. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 3, at 31.
12. See 1973 ANTRmusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-4 (July 17, 1980).
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usefulness of the theory of reciprocity"3 as a basis for challenging
14
conglomerate mergers under section seven of the Clayton Act.
This article will examine two opposing approaches to reciprocity,
and will analyze each in terms of its usefulness in attacking conglomerate mergers. Additionally, alternative means of dealing directly with problems created by increased conglomeration and

aggregate concentration will be discussed.
ANTITRUST LAWS APPLICABLE TO CONGLOMERATE MERGERS

Current antitrust merger law focuses on the anticompetitive consequences of a conglomerate merger in a particular line of com-

merce and does not deal with the specific economic, social, and political ramifications associated with conglomerate mergers. Section
7 of the Clayton Act,1 6 as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act in
1950, ' prohibits any merger, whether vertical, horizontal, or conglomerate in nature, if the effect of the merger may be to substantially lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce. Conglomerate mergers may also be challenged by
the Federal Trade Commission under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,17 which prohibits the use of unfair methods of competition.
Conglomerate mergers have been successfully challenged under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act through the use of three theories: potential competition, entrenchment, and reciprocity. The potential
competition doctrine focuses on the loss of procompetitive effects
on the market had the acquiring firm entered the industry by
means other than merger.1 8 The entrenchment theory deals with
13. Reciprocity is "the use of buying power to secure a competitive advantage in the sale
of one's own products." See VON KALINOWSKI, 16 G. Business Organizations, ANTIRruSr
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 63.01 (6th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as VON KALINOWSKI.
14. 15 U.S.C. §18 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
No corporation ... shall acquire ... the whole or any part of the stock ... [or]
any part of the assets of another corporation ... where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15. See note 14 supra.
16. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976) provides: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."
18. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974). For a general
discussion of potential competition and §7 of the Clayton Act, see Bauer, supra note 1, at
203-226; Bradley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1,
24-40 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bradley]; Yoerg, ForeignEntry and the PotentialCompetition Doctrine Under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 973, 976-78 (1978).
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the danger to competition posed by the acquisition of a major competitor in the target industry and the possibility of the acquired
firm using the extensive resources of the acquiring firm to "entrench" or augment its market position. 9 Reciprocity theory deals
with the anticompetitive effects which result from the use of a
company's purchasing power to gain a competitive advantage in
selling its products. 20
. Until the early 1970's, conglomerate mergers were successfully
challenged under each of these theories..21 Since that time, however, a trend has developed favoring defendants in conglomerate
merger cases. 22 Although consideration of the potential competition and entrenchment theories is beyond the scope of this article,
it may generally be stated that problems of proof have rendered
these theories ineffective in attacking conglomerate mergers.23 Although the theory of reciprocity has not been successfully employed in a conglomerate merger context since 1971,24 it may provide a viable basis for challenging conglomerate mergers in the
future.'5
THE THEORY OF RECIPROCITY

Reciprocity Defined
In its simplest form, reciprocity involves a company's use of its
purchasing power to promote the sale of its own products.' In a
conglomerate merger context, the acquiring firm utilizes its sub19. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967): Kennicott Copper
Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974). For a broader
discussion of entrenchment and §7 of the Clayton Act, see generally Bauer, supra note 1, at
226-29; Elman, Clorox & Conglomerate Mergers, 6 ABA ANTrrrsST L.J. 23, 23-29 (1967).
20. See notes 32-42 infra and accompanying text.
21. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 200-01, for a comprehensive list of successful and unsuccessful conglomerate merger challenges.
22. No conglomerate merger challenged under the federal antitrust laws has been declared illegal since 1974. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 200. The corresponding rise in the
number of conglomerate mergers since the middle 1970's reflects, at least in part, this trend
in conglomerate merger cases.
23. See generally Bauer, supra note 1, at 203-29; Bradley, supra note 18, at 1-5.
24. The last case in which a merger was successfully challenged on reciprocity grounds
was United States v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio
1971).
25. See text accompanying note 133 infra.
26. In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the
court described reciprocity as: "[T]he practice whereby a company, overtly or tacitly, agrees
to conduct one or more aspects of its business so as to confer a benefit on the other party to
the agreement; the consideration being the return promise in kind by the other party." Id.
at 57.
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stantial purchasing power to induce its suppliers to purchase from
the acquired firm. Secondary reciprocity, another form of the busito induce
ness practice, occurs when a firm induces its suppliers
7
their suppliers to purchase from the firm's affiliate.2
The term "reciprocity" embraces a variety of business relationships, which may be classified into three categories: coercive reciprocity, mutual reciprocity, and unilateral reciprocity. Coercive
reciprocity involves the use of a threat by a purchaser to either

withdraw purchase orders or withhold future purchases unless the
supplier makes reciprocal purchases.2 8 Inherent in the practice is
the exercise of economic leverage by a purchaser to exact reciprocal purchases from a disadvantaged supplier. Mutual or consensual
reciprocity is a voluntary arrangement between two companies of
relatively equal bargaining power.2 ' Although purchases by each
firm are conditioned upon reciprocal purchases, threats are unnec-

essary because the relationship stems from the possibility of mutual benefit to both parties. Unilateral reciprocity occurs when, absent an agreement between the parties, a supplier voluntarily
purchases from a firm to which it hopes to sell its own products.'"
Because unilateral reciprocity is not technically a reciprocal practice in that a purchase by one party is not conditioned upon reciprocal purchases by the other, unilateral reciprocity is generally referred to as "reciprocity effect.""1
The Anticompetitive Effects of Reciprocal Dealings
Although there is substantial disagreement among economists as
27. See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1969).
28. See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), discussed at notes
49-73 infra and accompanying text. See also VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, § 63.03(2);
Finney, Reciprocity and Public Policy, 2 ANmrRusT LAW & ECON. 97, 99 (1969) (hereinafter
cited as Finney].
29. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
where the court stated that "mutual patronage" reciprocity occurs when both parties agree
to purchase from one another even though they have equal purchasing power with respect to
each other. See also VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 15, § 63.03(2); Edwards, Conglomerate
Bigness as a Source of Power, in Nat. Bur. Eco. Research, Business Concentration and Price
Policy, 331 342 (1955); Flinn, Reciprocity and Related Topics Under the Sherman Act, 37
ANTrrmusT L.J. 156, 158 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Flinn].
30. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, § 63.03(2); Finney, supra note 35, at 99; Flinn,
supra note 29, at 158; Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 873, 877 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hausman].
31. See United States v. International Telephone & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 41-2
(D.Conn. 1970); United States v. International Telephone & Tel. Corp. 306 F. Supp. 766,
781 (D.Conn. 1969); United States v. Northwest Industries, 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1088 (N.D.
IM. 1969).
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to the economic consequences of reciprocity,

2

a number of an-

ticompetitive effects have been identified by courts which have addressed the issue of reciprocity." First, the traditional economic
decision-making criteria of price and quality are replaced at least
in part by reciprocity considerations.8 This distortion of the competitive market selection process promotes inefficiency by allowing
less competitive firms to prosper. 5 The cost of this practice may
ultimately be borne by the consumer in the form of higher prices
or inferior products. 86
Second, significant barriers to entry are raised when reciprocal
dealing is practiced. 7 Under traditional economic theory, the
threat of entry by new firms into the market stimulates competition among firms currently existing in the market. Firms without
reciprocity power, however, are reluctant to enter a market when
buyers in the market are engaged in reciprocal buying relationships with established market firms. 8 Thus, the incentive to compete is effectively removed.
Finally, market foreclosure is considered the most significant
anticompetitive effect of reciprocal purchasing.8 9 Conglomerates,
which by definition are involved in diverse business operations,
possess substantial purchasing power in many markets and thus
are well-suited for reciprocal dealings.40 To the extent that reciprocity is practiced in a market by a conglomerate, single-unit or

32. See Note, A Re-evaluation of Reciprocal Dealings and the Federal Antitrust Laws:
Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 11 Loy. Cm. L.J. 577, 580 (1980) [hereinafter referred to
as Note, Spartan Grain] for a discussion of the economic controversy surrounding
reciprocity.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand, 320 F.2d 509, 524 (1963); United States v.
Northwest Industries, 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1088 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 59 (1966).
34. The Supreme Court in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) stated
that: "The practice results in 'an irrelevant and alien factor.' - F.T.C., p. -, intruding into
the choice among competing products, creating at the least 'a priority on the business at
equal prices.'" Id. at 594. See also Hausman, supra note 30, at 879; Stocking & Mueller,
Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. U. Cm. 73, 85-88 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as Stocking & Mueller]; Turner, supra note 1, at 1387.
35. See Hausman, supra note 30, at 879. See also Turner, supra note 1, at 1387.
36. See Hausman, supra note 30, at 879.
37. See Hausman, supra note 30, at 879. See also BAIN, BARRmERS TO NEW COMPETITrON
(1956) [hereinafter cited as BAIN].
38. See generally BAn, supra note 37.
39. See VON KALNOWSKI, supra note 13, § 63.05(1).
40. It has been suggested that: "[d]iversification not only increases the number of opportunities for reciprocal buying, it increases their magnitude." See Stocking & Mueller, supra
note 34, at 77.

19811

Reciprocity and Conglomerate Mergers

non-diversified firms which do not have reciprocity leverage will be
foreclosed from that market.4 ' Diversified conglomerates are thus
likely to flourish when reciprocity is practiced. As conglomerates
prevail over competitors in the marketplace, aggregate concentration increases.42
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RECIPROCITY

The use of coercive reciprocity to promote sales was first condemned by the Federal Trade Commission in the 1930's. ' $ In
United States v. Griffith," a 1948 case decided under the Sherman
Act,45 the Supreme Court referred to the unacceptability of the
practice of reciprocity when it is used to create a monopoly or to
foreclose companies less favorably situated from the market." It
was not until 1963, however, that reciprocity theories were first
in a merger content. In United States v. Ingersoll-Rand
applied
47
Co.,

the Third Circuit Court of Appeals declared that reciprocity

was an anticompetitive practice which section 7 of the Clayton Act
was intended to prohibit.48 Finally, in 1965, the Supreme Court
dealt with reciprocity in a section 7 context in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,49 the Court's only treatment of the issue to
date.
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.: The Supreme Court's
Treatment of Reciprocity
Consolidated Foods Corp., the owner of a network of wholesale
and retail food stores, acquired Gentry, Inc., the second largest
producer of dehydrated onion and garlic in a highly concentrated
market.50 Consolidated Foods made substantial purchases from
41. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, § 63.05(1).
42. See Hausman, supra note 30, at 880.
43. See In re Mechanical Manufacturing Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); In re Waugh Equipment., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931). See also In re California Packing Corp. 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937).
These actions were instituted pursuant to §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See
note 17 supra.
44. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1976). See Note, SpartanGrain, supra note 32, for a general discussion of reciprocal dealings under the Sherman Act.
46. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948).
47. 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). See notes 76-81 infra and accompanying text.
48. 320 F.2d at 524.
49. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
50. Gentry, Inc., & Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., the leading industry producers, together accounted for 90% of the market, with each controlling, respectively, a 32% and 58%
market share of total industry sales. Two other producers accounted for the remaining 10%.
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food processors who in turn purchased dehydrated garlic and onions." This relationship created the opportunity for reciprocal
dealings, and post-acquisition evidence revealed that Consolidated
Foods did in fact engage in coercive reciprocity with food
5
processors.

2

In In Re Consolidated Foods Corp.5a the Federal Trade Commission ruled that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton
Act. First, the Commission established that the merger increased
the probability of reciprocal dealings in the garlic and onion industries. Two factors supported this finding: (1) an examination of the
market structure revealed that the reciprocity power of Consolidated Foods and Gentry would be substantially increased by the
merger;5 and (2) the fact that Consolidated Foods actually practiced reciprocity after the merger confirmed the finding that reciprocity power was created by the merger.55 The Commission further found that Gentry would have an unfair advantage over its
principal competitor merely as a result of the connection with Consolidated Foods." The Commission concluded that when a merger
created reciprocity power, the acquired firm would gain an unfair
advantage through reciprocity effect, even if coercive or mutual
57
reciprocity were not practiced.
Second, the Commission determined that the potential anticompetitive effects created by the merger were substantial. Evidence
established that approximately twenty-five percent of all purchasers in both the garlic and onion industries were substantial suppliers of Consolidated Foods and thus subject to reciprocity pressures
from that firm." The Commission further concluded that the
merger violated section seven because it created the power to foreId. at 595.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 596-97.
53. 62 F.T.C. 929 (1963).
54. Potential customers of Gentry were substantial suppliers of Consolidated Foods. Id.
at 955.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The Commission found that Gentry could gain sales from processed food suppliers or
prospective suppliers who would in turn hope that Consolidated Foods would reciprocate by
purchasing processed food. Id.
58. Id. at 957. This finding was supported by the fact that Gentry, the acquired firm,
already commanded a substantial share in an already concentrated market. The Commission concluded that any increase in sales within this two-firm oligopoly structure would only
serve to enhance the noncompetitive nature of the industry and raise higher entry barriers
into the market. id. at 959.
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close competition from a substantial share of the market, 59 thereby
creating a probability of a substantial lessening of competition in
the dehydrated garlic and onion industries.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
Commission and approved the merger. e The court concluded that
post-acquisition evidence showed no substantial impact on the
market, despite the efforts of Consolidated Foods to promote reciprocal dealings. 61 Thus, a probability of substantial anticompetitive effect had not been established. 2
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit,6e stating that the potential for reciprocity made possible by
the merger was one of the "congeries of anticompetitive practices"
against which the antitrust laws were intended to protect." The
Court therefore declared that reciprocity constituted a violation of
section 7 if a probability of substantial anticompetitive effect on
the market in question could be established.6 5 Examination by the
Court of evidence of the market structure after the merger revealed that the merger created substantial opportunities for reciprocal dealing. The Court emphasized that post-acquisition evidence of actual reciprocal dealing and resulting changes in
individual company market shares supported the Commission's
ruling. 6 The Court therefore held that the findings of the Federal

59. In this case, 25% was considered a substantial share of the market. Id. at 957.
60. See Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964).
61. Post-acquisition evidence showed that Gentry's share of the dehydrated onion market increased by 7% while its share of the dehydrated garlic market decreased by 12%. Id.
at 626.
62. Id. at 626-27.
63. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
64. Id. at 594. The Court further noted that reciprocal dealing may not result from
"bludgeoning or coercion," but from more subtle arrangements, such as a threatened withdrawal of orders or a conditioning of future orders on reciprocal purchases. Id. Subsequently, in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the
district court stated that mutual reciprocity as well as coercive reciprocity was prohibited
under §7 of the Clayton Act. Citing Consolidated Foods, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court implied that mutual reciprocity is as anticompetitive as coercive reciprocity.
Id. at 58-59.
65. 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
66. Id. at 600-01. It should be noted that the post-acquisition evidence was open to two
interpretations. The fact that Gentry maintained its market position, even though it marketed an inferior product could imply that reciprocity had successfully maintained the company's market share. The Supreme Court accepted this interpretation of the evidence. The
same evidence could also imply, however, that the reciprocal dealings had no substantial
anticompetitive effect since Gentry's market share had not increased. The Court of Appeals
based its decision on this interpretation of the evidence. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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Trade Commission were supported by substantial evidence.
The Supreme Court's approval of the overall findings of the
Commission may implicitly suggest that the Court approved the
Commission's statements that the mere existence of reciprocity
power is sufficient to establish a probability of a substantial lessening of competition. These statements by the Commission, however,
were not essential to the Commission's findings or to the decision
of the Court because Consolidated Foods actually engaged in reciprocity after the merger. The Court did not directly address the
question of whether a merger which resulted in a market structure
conducive to substantial reciprocal effect alone would create a
probability of substantial anticompetitive effect.
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, 7 however, squarely
confronted this issue. He stated that the mere opportunity for reciprocity was not sufficient by itself to invalidate a merger under
section seven. 68 Justice Stewart reasoned that to hold otherwise
would effectively outlaw diversification because the possibility of
reciprocal relationships is almost always created by conglomerate
mergers. Justice Stewart further urged the Court to formulate
standards of analysis for determining how effective reciprocity
must be in order to invalidate a merger. 69 In Justice Stewart's
view, even actual reciprocity practices would not necessarily violate
section 7 unless the probability of a significant alteration in the
market structure can be established.7
Justice Stewart's concurrence thus rejected the implication of
the majority that the mere opportunity for reciprocity would be
sufficient to establish a section seven violation. Further, he called
for a "more closely textured economic analysis" to determine
whether the effect of any reciprocal dealings would be substantially
anticompetitive. 71 Courts in subsequent reciprocity cases have
either rejected Justice Stewart's view by holding that the mere opportunity for reciprocity is sufficient for a section 7 violation,7 or

have embraced his views and developed a structural economic
analysis of the probable effect of reciprocal dealings on the market
in question. 8
67.

Id. at 602.

68. Id. at 603.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 604.
Id.
Id. at 603.
See note 74-92 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 93-126 infra and accompanying text.
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"Reciprocity Effect:" A Sufficient Basis to Establish Violation of
Section Seven
A number of courts have adopted the position that the mere
presence of reciprocity power, or reciprocity effect, may substantially affect competition. Under this approach, the existence of
substantial purchasing power is held to induce hopeful suppliers of
one of the merging companies to voluntarily purchase from the
other merging company, thereby foreclosing suppliers with less
reciprocity leverage from that market. As one court noted, when
reciprocity leverage exists, a competitor will prevail only when its
price is the lowest.7 4 There is no chance that when price and quality are equal, the "flip of the coin" will be resolved in favor of the
competitor without leverage.7 5 The purchaser will always choose a
supplier who may reciprocate.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 7 6 was the first court to adopt this approach. The
case involved the attempted purchase of three leading producers of
coal mining machinery by Ingersoll-Rand, a large manufacturer of
industrial equipment."7 Ingersoll-Rand was a substantial purchaser
of steel, and the steel manufacturers were in turn substantial purchasers of coal.7 8 The market structure after the merger was thus
highly conducive to reciprocal dealings in that Ingersoll-Rand
could coerce its steel suppliers to induce their coal suppliers to
purchase from Ingersoll-Rand's newly acquired coal mining equipment manufacturers.7
The mere existence of these possible reciprocal relationships was
held to be sufficient grounds to uphold the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court approved the district court's observation that Ingersoll-Rand need not consciously employ its reciprocity power to improve the market shares of its affiliates. 80 The court
reasoned that the mere existence of this purchasing power would
alert the astute businessperson to the benefits of establishing a
74.

See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y.

1966).
75. Id. at 61.
76. 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
77. The three leading coal mining machinery producers accounted for 60% of total market sales. Id. at 524.
78. Id.
79. This case is a classic example of secondary reciprocity. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
80. 320 F.2d at 524.
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favorable business relationship with Ingersoll-Rand. 81
This liberal approach to reciprocity was also embraced by the
Southern District Court of New York in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp. 2 The defendant, General Dynamics Corp., implemented a full-scale reciprocity program designed to reap all possible reciprocity benefits made possible by the merger. Thus, the
court did not face the issue of whether reciprocity effect alone was
sufficient to establish a section 7 violation. The court stated, however, that the mere presence of reciprocity power often leads to
abuse and may operate to artificially stimulate sales, even absent
overt utilization of the power. 88 The court further stated that the
anticompetitive consequences stemming from the presence of reciprocity power may be sufficiently serious to warrant diversiture."
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reaffirmed its
Ingersoll-Rand position in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc.,8 a case factually similar to IngersollRand.8 O The Third Circuit stated that a merger which creates a
market structure conducive to reciprocal dealings is by itself anticompetitive. 87 The court supported this position by a general reference only to the Supreme Court opinion in ConsolidatedFoods.s
Another court adopted a similar stance in a case factually related to Allis-Chalmers. In United States v. White Consolidated,
Inc.,89 the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio stated
that a substantial lessening of competition results when the market
structure is conducive to reciprocity, regardless of the intention of
the parties to actually engage in reciprocity. 90 The sheer size of the
81. Id.
82. 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
83. Id. at 58-9.
84. Id. at 67.
85. 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
86. White Consolidated, a diversified manufacturer, attempted to acquire Allis-Chalmers, a manufacturer similar in size. Allis-Chalmers opposed the merger, in part on the
basis of reciprocity. Because White Consolidated had already acquired Blaw-Knox Company, a leading manufacturer of rolling mills, the combined purchasing power of the merged
company in steel mill products would be enormous. The merged firm could thus induce its
steel mill products suppliers to induce their steel suppliers to purchase rolling fills from
Blau-Knox. The court did not consider the fact that reciprocal power already existed from
the White Consolidated-Blaw-Knox affiliation. Id. at 519.
87. Id. at 518.
88. Id.
89. 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971). The case involved the merger of a sister firm,
White Motor Corporation, with White Consolidated which would create a market structure
similar to that found in Allis-Chalmers. See note 86 supra.
90. 323 F. Supp. at 1398.
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parties in the market was considered by the court to "operate as a
lever" to lessen competition. 91
Guidelines issued by the Department of Justice also reflect this
view of reciprocity effect. 9" The Department of Justice employs a
statistical approach to determine whether to challenge a conglomerate merger on the basis of reciprocity. A merger will be challenged for creating a significant danger of reciprocal buying when
fifteen percent or more of the sales in any market where one of the
merging firms sells are made by substantial suppliers of the other
merging firm. The Department of Justise maintains that under
these circumstances the opportunity for reciprocity after the
merger is substantial and therefore sufficient to support a merger
challenge.
"Reciprocity Effect:" An Insufficient Basis to Establish a
Violation of Section Seven
The notion that a merger is illegal merely because it creates the
opportunity for reciprocal dealings has been rejected in a second
line of cases. As urged by Justice Stewart in ConsolidatedFoods, a
"more closely textured economic analysis" has been developed to
determine whether reciprocity will actually be practiced, and if so,
whether it will have a substantial anticompetitive effect. For example, in United States v. Pennick & Ford, Ltd.," the District Court
of New Jersey refused to invalidate a merger despite evidence that
reciprocity activity was a common practice in the acquired firm's
market. 94 The court focused on three factors which indicated that
the merger did not create a probability of reciprocity which would
have substantial anticompetitive effects. First, unlike a merger in
an oligopolistic market setting,"5 ten firms competed aggressively
in the acquired firm's market." Second, the fact that reciprocity
was practiced to some degree in the industry before the proposed
merger did not prevent a new entrant from becoming an industry
leader. Thus, the relatively unconcentrated structure of the industry did not raise substantial barriers to market entry.'7 Finally, the

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
49-73
96.
97.

Id.
See Dept. of Justice Guidelines, 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510, at 6888.
242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965).
Id. at. 525-26.
See, e.g. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), discussed at notes
supra and accompanying text.
242 F.Supp. at 524.
Id.
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acquiring company presented evidence of an anti-reciprocity policy, and the government failed to offer any evidence in rebuttal to
suggest a departure from this policy.9 s The court therefore concluded that reciprocal dealings were not likely to occur after the
merger, and that in any event, no substantial anticompetitive effects were likely to result. 99
In United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc.,100 the District
Court for the Northern District Illinois applied an even more restrictive approach to reciprocity. The court refused to invalidate a
merger, even though it found that the merger would greatly increase the potential for reciprocity, 10 1 and despite evidence that
the customers and suppliers of both merging companies were engaging in reciprocity.10 2 In reaching its decision, the court focused
on two factors which indicated that reciprocity would not actually
be practiced after the merger. First, the acquired company's president testified that the company followed an unwritten anti-reciprocity policy. 10 3 Second, the acquiring company, a diversified conglomerate, treated each subsidiary as a separate profit center, with
each manager having a financial stake in the profits of the subsidiary.' Based on these two factors, the court concluded that it was
impossible to determine whether reciprocity would actually be
practiced.
The "more closely textured economic analysis," advocated by
Justice Stewart in ConsolidatedFoods 0 5 and applied by the courts
in Penick & Ford and Northwest Industries, took the form of an
analysis addressing the particular facts involved and emphasizing
such factors as anti-reciprocity policy, more competitive market
structures, and ineffective past reciprocal dealings. An even more
comprehensive analytical framework was later set forth by two
courts, the District Court of Connecticut and the Northern District
Court of Illinois, in three decisions involving merger challenges to
which International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (ITT) was a
party: United States v. ITT (Grinnell and Hartford)106; United

98.

Id. at 525.

99.

Id.

100.

301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. I. 1969).

101. Id. at 1088.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1088-89.
Id. at 1091-92.
Id. at 1092.
See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969) (action for preliminary injunction of mergers be-
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States v. ITT (Grinnell)107; and United States v. ITT
(Canteen)."'0
A two-step analysis was applied in all three decisions to determine whether the merger would result in a substantial lessening of
competition because of the reciprocal dealings made possible by
the merger. First, it must be determined whether the market structure after the merger will create an opportunity for reciprocal dealing. ioe A careful analysis of the following factors is required to
make this complex determination: (1) the extent to which suppliers
of the acquired firm are actual or potential purchasers of the acquired firm's products; 110 (2) whether the acquired firm's business
has characteristics which encourage reciprocal dealings;' (3) the
scope of the market represented by the acquiring company for
products sold by its suppliers;"' (4) the size and diversification of
other companies to which the acquired suppliers sell their products;' and (5) the degree to which the markets within which the
suppliers operate are competitively structured."'
tween ITT and Grinnell Corp., a leading manufacturer of automatic sprinkler systems and
pipe hangers, and between ITT and Hartford Fire Ins. Co., a leading property and liability
insurance company).
107. 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970) (decision after trial on the merits upholding the
merger between ITT and Grinnell).
108. 1971 Trade Cas. 73,619 (N.D. II. 1971) (decision after trial on merits upholding
merger between ITT and Canteen Corp., a vending and manual food service supplier).
109. See U.S. v. ITT (Canteen), 1971 Trade Cas. 73,619, at 90,545-46 (N.D. IM. 1971);
U.S. v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19, 42 (D. Conn. 1970).
110. For example, in the Grinnell merger, the water sprinkler market structure was not
conducive to reciprocity because a substantial number of sprinkler systems were sold to
non-industrial organizations who were not actual or potential suppliers of ITT. 324 F. Supp.
at 43.
111. For example, in the Hartford merger, the court found that insurance was not a
product conducive to reciprocal dealings because it is not advantageous for companies to
change insurance carriers. 306 F. Supp. at 788.
112. For example, in the Grinnell merger, despite the fact that ITT is a substantial purchaser of goods and services from numerous domestic suppliers, the purchases involved represented only a minute proportion of the sales of its suppliers. 324 F. Supp. at 42.
113. This factor focuses on the ability of large diversified suppliers to resist coercion
without risk of substantial loss.
114. Reciprocal dealing is more likely to occur in oligopolistic markets where price and
quality are substantially equal. In the Hartford merger, the court indicated that the government could not clearly establish that the merger created a market structure conducive to
reciprocal dealing without evidence that the market structure of the industry is non-competitive. 306 F. Supp. at 789. Similarly, in United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F.
Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965), discussed at notes 93-99 supra and accompanying text, the court
found critical the fact that the acquired firm's market consisted of ten viable, aggressive
competitors in determining that the market structure was not conducive to reciprocity. See
notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text.
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If a market structure conducive to reciprocal dealings can be established, the next step of the analysis is to assess the likelihood
that reciprocity will in fact occur." 5 Factors to be considered in

making this determination include: (1) a firm's adherence to an
anti-reciprocity policy;" 6 (2) the existence of individual profit centers; ' 7 (3) a firm's failure to gather data necessary to identify reciprocity opportunities;" 8 and (4) the fact that the merging companies have not engaged in or benefited from past reciprocal dealings
in the industry.1 9 The District Court of Connecticut concluded
that when the first three factors are present, reciprocity would not
be likely to occur, even if a market structure conducive to reciprocal dealing was created by the merger.2 0 Similarly, the Northern
District Court of Illinois concluded that, when all four factors are
present, adequate safeguards against any significant practice of re2
ciprocal dealings would be demonstrated.' '

The Northern District Court of Illinois added a third step to the
above analysis by further determining whether those reciprocal
dealings, if proven likely to occur, would have substantial anticompetitive effects. 22 The court did not discuss this third element in
detail because the plaintiff failed to meet the second requirement
of establishing a likelihood of reciprocal dealings. In United States
v. General Dynamics Corp.,"8 however, the Southern District
115. See, U.S. v. ITT (Canteen), 1971 Trade Cas. 73,619, at 90,545 (N.D. Ill. 1971); U.S.
v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19, 42 (D. Conn. 1970).
116. In the Grinnell merger, the court noted that ITT had a written antireciprocity policy which was widely disseminated on a continuing basis since 1966. 324 F. Supp. at 46. In
the Canteen merger, the court also emphasized the long-standing anti-reciprocity policy of
ITT. 1971 Trade Cas. at 90,552. The existence of anti-reciprocity policies was also essential
to the decisions in United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965),
discussed at notes 93-99 supra. and accompanying text, and United States v. Northwest
Industries, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. I. 1969), discussed at notes 100-104 supra and
accompanying text, even though there was no evidence that these policies were actively promoted. See notes 98 and 103 supra and accompanying text.
117. The profit center organization of IIT was significant in all three merger decisions
for a determination that reciprocity was not in fact likely to occur. See U.S. v. ITT (Canteen), 1971 Trade Cas. 73,619 at 90,552 (N.D. Ill. 1971); U.S. v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp.
19, 46 (D. Conn. 1970); U.S. v. ITT (Grinnell and Hartford), 306 F. Supp 766, 782-83, 790
(D. Conn. 1969). The court in United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066
(N.D.Ill. 1969), discussed at notes 100-104 supra and accompanying text, also emphasized
this factor. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
118. 1971 Trade Cas. at 90,552; 324 F. Supp. at 44-45.
119. 1971 Trade Cas. at 90,551; 324 F. Supp. at 43.
120. 306 F. Supp. at 783, 790.
121. 1971 Trade Cas. at 90,552-53.
122. 1971 Trade Cas. at 90,544.
123. 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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Court of New York adopted a similar three-step analysis and provided more specific guidance for determining when reciprocal dealings will have substantial anticompetitive effects. The court stated
that a threshold determination must be made of the amount of
market foreclosure which can be expected to occur as a result of
the defendant's activities.' " Next, it must be determined whether
this amount of foreclosure is sufficient to substantially lessen competition.'2 5 The percent of foreclosure necessary for a substantial
lessening of competition should then depend on the concentration
level of the industry.""
THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF THE THEORY OF REcIPRocrY IN
ATTACKING CONGLOMERATE MERGERS

Current State of the Law
The Penick & Ford,Northwest Industries,and ITT cases reflect
a reluctance on the part of courts to find a probability of substantial anticompetitive effects resulting from reciprocal dealings. In
Northwest Industries, the court refused to find a probability that
reciprocity would be practiced, despite evidence which showed that
reciprocity was being practiced by both Northwest Industries and
B. F. Goodrich and their customers and suppliers."17 Although the
court acknowledged the anticompetitive effects engendered by reciprocity as well as the reciprocity leverage created by the challenged
merger,"68 the court justified its decision on two questionable evidentiary grounds which allegedly discouraged reciprocal dealings:
an unwritten anti-reciprocity policy and the existence of independent profit centers."' The court did not, however, question the effectiveness of a company policy against reciprocity which was
never reduced to writing. Moreover, no evidence was offered to indicate that this policy was actively promoted in any way throughout the company. Further, the court ignored the possibility that
even though each subsidiary operated as an independent profit

124. 258 F. Supp. at 63. An approximation of this amount may be made by determining:
(1) the amount of sales made to major suppliers who are able to reciprocate; and (2) the
percentage of the acquired firm's market this figure represents. Id.
125. Id. at 64.
126. Because of the highly concentrated nature of the industry, a predicted market
foreclosure figure as marginal as 1.3% was found sufficient to sustain the challenge to the
merger. Id.
127. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
128. See notes 101-102 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 103-104 supra and accompanying text.
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center, profit center managers might collaborate to establish a reciprocity policy beneficial to all. The decision in Penick & Ford also
suggests that, even though reciprocity may commonly be practiced
in the relevant markets of the merging companies or by the companies themselves, evidence demonstrating such facts will not necessarily establish a probability that reciprocity will be engaged in after the merger. s
.
Finally, the ITT cases fully incorporate the significant factors
considered in Penick & Ford and Northwest Industries. These
cases indicate that even if a market structure highly conducive to
reciprocal dealing is created by the merger, the merger will not
necessarily be deemed illegal if the merging companies appear to
adhere to an anti-reciprocity policy or are structurally organized
into independent profit centers.131 Thus, it seems possible that a
challenge to a merger predicated on the theory of reciprocity may
be defeated if the merging companies at least13 2appear to adopt a
policy designed to prevent reciprocal dealings.
Nonetheless, reciprocity may still serve as a viable substantive
tool for challenging conglomerate mergers if courts in the future
adopt the view that a merger which creates the opportunity for
substantial reciprocal dealings violates section seven of the Clayton
Act. The Ingersoll-Rand line of cases provides strong support for
courts willing to adopt this theory as a means of halting the trend
toward increased conglomeration. A reciprocity effect analysis,
which does not require the detailed projection of expected reciprocity practices embodied in the ITT analysis, imposes a substantially lighter burden of proof. Once it is established that the
merger creates a market structure conducive to reciprocity, it is
presumed under the reciprocity effect theory that the resulting
anti-competitive effects will be substantial. Thus, particularly in
light of the current ineffectiveness of other substantive grounds
sought to support a conglomerate merger challenge,83 the reciprocity effect theory may provide the most viable avenue for control130.

See notes 94-99 supra and accompanying text.

131.

See notes 115-121 supra and accompanying text.

132. Although the operation of trade relations departments which openly engaged in reciprocity was a common practice of conglomerate firms until 1965, as corporations became
aware of the illegality of this business practice, trade relations departments were eliminated
and anti-reciprocity policies were at least nominally adopted. Thus, it would appear that
most corporations would now be able to successfully defend a merger challenge predicated
on reciprocity grounds in courts which adopt the ITT approach.
133. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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ling the recent surge of conglomerate mergers.
Renewed Interest in Reciprocity
The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice
in the recent past have expressed interest in pursuing the theory of
reciprocity as a basis for challenging conglomerate mergers. The
Federal Trade Commission has bean seeking test cases to challenge
conglomerate mergers under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.1 " The FTC expressed interest in the use of reciprocity as a basis for congomerate merger challenges. 85
In October, 1978, the Department of Justice filed an action
against United Technologies Corporation.' The action was consolidated with a private action previously instituted by Carrier
Corporation to block a tender offer and takeover bid by United
Technologies. 8 7 Both Carrier Corporation and the government
challenged the proposed tender offer on the basis of entrenchment,
reciprocity, and horizontal and vertical competition theories.'" In
a preliminary injunction proceeding, in which the injunction was
denied, the Northern District Court of New York applied the
three-step ITT analysis to the reciprocity claim.' 8 9
The court examined the anti-reciprocity policies of the defendant to determine the probability of future reciprocal dealings.
The court suggested that, although United Technologies had a
written policy against reciprocity, the proffered evidence cast
doubt upon the extent to which these written policies were disseminated and carried out. 140 Noting that some instances of reciprocal
dealing had occurred, the court stated that further discovery might
reveal more widespread reciprocal practices and that the questions
involved were of sufficient significance to warrant a trial on the
merits. Significantly, the court looked beyond the surface of antireciprocity policies and suggested inquiry into their effectiveness.
The possibility of feigned anti-reciprocity policies operating suc-

134. 848 ANTITRUST & TRADs RaG. RzP. (BNA) AA-1-2 (Jan. 26, 1979) (Statement of
Bureau Director Dougherty); 873 AmrmusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-3 (July 20,
1978) (Statement of Chairman Pertschuk).
135. See 891 ANTITRUST & TADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-18 (Nov. 30, 1978) (Statement of
Assistant Bureau Director Schwartz).
136. 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,393 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 76,361.
139. Id. at 76,371.
140. Id. at 76,372.
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cessfully as a defense will be reduced if other jurisdictions follow
the lead of the court in United Technologies by carefully scrutinizing evidence of this defense.
The Need for Legislation
The renewed interest of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in using reciprocity as a basis for attacking
conglomerate mergers is in response to a growing concern over the
trend toward conglomeration and aggregate economic concentration developing during the past twenty years. The current surge of
conglomerate acquisitions has highlighted this concern. Attention
has centered specifically on the economic, political, and social consequences of increased conglomeration and economic
1 41
concentration.
Section seven of the Clayton Act, however, does not focus on
these problems. Rather, section 7 addresses the anticompetitive effects of a merger in a particular line of commerce. The analysis
which has developed under the reciprocity theory is aimed at
preventing undue concentration in any particular industry. As a
result, reciprocity may not be suitable for attacking the problem of
increased aggregated concentration. New legislation is needed
which deals directly with these problems.
Several legislative proposals prohibit conglomerate mergers on
the basis of the size of the merging entities. One such proposal,
incorporated into the Kennedy-Metzenbaum bill, " 2 generally prohibits mergers if the assets or sales of one of the merging entities
exceed a specified amount. Such acquisitions are permitted, however, if positive societal benefits from the merger can be demonstrated. An alternative proposal by the Federal Trade Commission
embodies a "cap and spin-off" approach,14 s which would permit acquisitions by large firms only if accompanied by the divestiture of
other viable entities equivalent in size to the acquired firm.14 4 Both
of these proposals would accomplish the goal of halting the current
conglomerate merger movement and the growing trend toward increased aggregate concentration.

141. See note 7 supra.
142. The Small Business Protection Act, S. 600, 96th Congress 1st Session (1979).
143. Proposed New Section 78 of the Clayton Act, reprinted in Pertschuk & Davidson,
supra note 4, at 21-24.
144. See Pertschuk and Davidson, supra note 4, at 17-18.
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CONCLUSION

The current merger movement has sparked renewed interest in
reciprocity as a basis for conglomerate merger challenges under
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Although the theory has not been
successfully employed for that purpose since 1971, the theory may
still be viable. Courts following the ITT approach are unlikely to
find that reciprocity is a sufficient basis for establishing a section
seven violation. However, if courts were to adopt the IngersollRand approach that a merger may violate section 7 if it creates the
opportunity for reciprocal dealings, there is chance for success in
challenging anticompetitive conglomerate mergers. Because reciprocity theories are aimed at preventing concentration in a particular line of commerce and not in the economy as a whole, new legislation which directly confronts the problems caused by increased
conglomeration and aggregate concentration must be adopted.
Only through the revitalization of the reciprocity theory or other
theories applicable to conglomerate mergers under section 7, or
through the enactment of new legislation, can the anticompetitive
effects of conglomerate mergers be controlled.
CAROL A. DOYLE

